Robert O. Christensen v. Ethel T. Christensen : Respondent\u27s Appeal Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1976
Robert O. Christensen v. Ethel T. Christensen :
Respondent's Appeal Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Hanson & Garrett; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Christensen v. Christensen, No. 11003 (1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4375
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT 0. CHRISTENSEN, 
P'laintif f and Respondent, 
vs. 
ETHEL CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant and Appell,ant. 
Case No. 
11003 
RESPONDENT'S APPEAL BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment of the 
Second District Court for Davis County 
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
MOFFAT IVERSON AND TAYLOR 
1311 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ______________________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ______________________ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT -------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------ 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO GRANT 
A DIVORCE TO THE RESPONDENT 
AGAINST THE APPELLANT ____________________________ 7 
POINT II: 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
NOT AWARDING THE APPELLANT 
ANY P·E RI 0 DIC ALIMONY AND 
GRANTING IN LIEU THEREOF THE 
AMOUNT OF $2,400 PLUS THE HOUSE 
AND ALL OF THE FUR NI S HI N G S 
THEREIN ---------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
CONCLUSION --------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
CASES CITED 
C1iny vs. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 Pac. 
2d 939 ( 1958) -------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
G!'iffiths 1'S. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 182, 278 Pac. 
2d 983 ( 1955) -------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
Mm·Unett vs. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 Pac. 
2d 821 ( 1958) -------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
ll'l1 itehcad I'S. Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 Pac. 
2d 987 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT 0. CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ETHEL CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11003 
RESPONDENT'S APPEAL BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a divorce action between the Respondent 
and the Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial was first had in this matter on the 15th 
day of June, 1965, before the Honorable Thornley 
K. Swan in the Second Judicial District Court of the 
State of Utah in and for Davis County, at which 
time the Court awarded the respondent a divorce, 
granted custody of the three minor children to the 
appellant, with an award of child support of $100 
per month for each of said children, and awarded 
a distribution of the property between the parties, 
1 
which gave the home and the household furnishings 
to the appellant in lieu of any periodic alimony; 
and fu1·ther ordered that the respondent pay all of 
the outstanding family indebtedness existing at that 
time, which amounted to $933.56, and $125.00 ow-
ing on the automobile awarded to appellant; and 
that the respondent was to pay $200.00 of the appel-
lant's attorney's fee. 
Subsequent to this judgment the appellant made 
a motion for a new trial, which was granted; and 
on the 21st day of June, 1966, a second trial was 
held before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan in 
which evidence was put forth concerning the ques-
tions of alimony, support money, property settle-
ment, and grounds for a divorce. And at the conclu-
sion of said trial, the Court entered a judgment 
granting a divorce to the respondent, granting cus-
tody of the children to the appellant and $100 a ' 
month support money for each of said children; the 
home and furnishings therein were awarded to the 
appellant in lieu of any periodic alimony, and a lump 
sum amount of $2,400 alimony was awarded to the 
appellant with the respondent having the option of 
paying it in a lump sum or at the rate of $100 per 
month; appellant was awarded one automobile and 
the respondent was awarded the other automobile; 
and the respondent was ordered to pay the balance 
of the family indebtedness existing at the time of 
the first judgment, amounting to $933.56, and $100 
for the appellant's attorney's fee. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
Court entered the 6th day of July, 1966, affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the following material, references to the 
first trial in 1965 will be ( 65 TR ____ ) and the sec-
ond trial in 1966 as ( 66 TR ____ ). 
The parties were married in Palo Alto, Califor-
nia, in 1940. Five children were born of that mar-
riage, two of which were dependent upon and resid-
ing with the appellant at the time of the second trial 
in this matter ( 66 TR 4). The children presently 
residing with the appellant are Norma, 16 years of 
age, and Charles, 13 years of age. The parties have 
lived in a home at 3187 South Crestview Circle, in 
Bountiful, Utah, since 1950. The home is valued 
from $12,000 to $15,000, with a $4,000 indebtedness 
still owing, which is payable at $64 per month. The 
respondent has for some number of years been em-
ployed as an examiner for the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, which job requires him to travel ex-
tensively throughout the western United States, in-
cluding Hawaii and Alaska. He has worked various 
jobs prior to this employment which usually requires 
an accounting education which he does not have ( 66 
TR 16-17) . While on the road, he is paid a per diem 
of $16 except in Alaska where it is higher. While he 
was on the road, he would stay in sub-standard type 
accommodations and eat inexpensive meals in order 
that he could send part of the per diem home to the 
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appellant ( 66 TR 11). At the time of the trial the 
respondent was a Grade 9 in the Civil Service rating 1 
system and had a take-home pay of approximately 
$218.65 ( 66 TR 18-19). He also received 10 cents a 
mile while operating his automobile in the Govern-
ment business. The other examiners who work with 
him are Grade 11, and he has reached the point that 
he cannot rise to a higher grade. ( 66 TR 17). 
During the marriage the appellant has worked 
full time on several jobs at various times; however, 
since 1960 she has not worked full time, but has 
worked part-time jobs and was at the time of trial 
working a part-time job as a public stenographer. 
( 66 TR 39-40). She is trained as a secretary. Dur-
ing their marriage there has been continual argu-
ments concerning finances and concerning the ap-
pellant's attitude as exhibited in public towards the 1 
respondent as a provider and as a husband and fa- 1 
ther ( 66 TR 5-6) . After several years of such quar-
reling and disagreement, the respondent filed an 
action requesting a divorce from the appellant. The 
appellant answered and filed a counterclaim asking 
for the home and all of the furnishings, $600 per 
month alimony and support, and a divorce from the 
respondent. 
On the 22nd day of March, 1965, an order 
awarding temporary alimony and support money 
was entered. On the 15th day of June, 1965, a trial 
was held by the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, at 
which time the appe_llant was represented by a Ver-
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Jen E. Bettilyon. A the beginning of that trial, Mr. 
Bettilyon informed the Court that "Well, your Hon-
or, my client does not want to proceed with entering 
the grounds for divorce, and we feel under these 
ci1·cumstances that we should allow the plaintiff to 
proceed to present grounds for divorce. We will 
then take the position of not contesting it, with the 
knowledge again that this will not influence the 
Court's decision as to property division and support 
money and alimony" ( 66 TR 2-3). Judgment was 
entered after the trial awarding a divorce to the 
respondent and granting the appellant custody of 
the children plus $100 per child support money, plus 
the home and all of the furnishings, and ordering 
the respondent to pay all of the then existing obli-
gations other than the mortgage on the house and 
furniture, and a portion of the obligation on one of 
the cars (R 15-16). Several days after the judg-
ment was entered, the appellant's attorney, Verden 
E. Bettilyon, withdrew from the case and Mr. J. 
Grant Iverson entered as an appearance for the ap-
pellant. The Motion for New Trial was filed com-
plaining that the evidence did not support the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court 
granted a new trial, which was held on the 21st day 
of June, 1966. Meanwhile, the parties' 18-year-old 
son, who had been living with the appellant at 
the time of the first trial, became married and set 
up a household of his own separate and apart from 
the appellant, thus leaving only two minor children 
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in the custody of the appellant. The respondent, 
meanwhile, paid the debts which he had been order-
ed to pay by the Court, which amounted to approxi-
mately $933 ( 66 TR 58-59), thus eliminating all 
obligations except those on the house and its fur-
nishings. 
After the original action had been filed, the 
respondent requested more out-of-town assignments 
and did receive them, which amounted to him being 
away from Salt Lake City approximately 50% to 
75% of the time (66 TR 22). Prior to the filing of 
the action, however, he was not out of town as much 
as he was after he made the above request. During 
the first six months of 1966, the appellant made 
$1,053.27 as a public stenographer ( 66 TR 39). She 
also received $200 per month in support money from 
the respondent ( 66 TR 44). She claims that her 
average expenses for the period were $519.40 per 1 
month ( 66 TR 44). At the time of the second trial, 
the Court allowed the parties to put on evidence con-
cerning the question of alimony, support money and , 
property settlement; and it was understood that the 
respondent could produce further testimony in con-
nection with the grounds for the divorce. After the 
trial the Court entered judgment accordingly, grant-
ing to the respondent a divorce and ordering him to 
pay to the appellant $100 per month per child as 
support; and in lieu of periodic alimony, the Court 
awarded to the appellant the home and all the fur-
nishings therein plus a lump sum alimony of $2,400, 
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which could be paid at the rate of $100 per month. 
The Court also awarded one car to each party and 
directed the respondent to pay a part of the appel-
lant's attorney's fees and to pay the balance of any 
delinquent family indebtedness which were existing 
at the time of the institution of the divorce (R 26-
27). Appeal was taken from the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE UPON WHICH TO GRANT A DI-
VORCE TO THE RESPONDENT AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT. 
The appellant in this case is in a somewhat 
peculiar situation inasmuch as at the beginning of 
the first trial the appellant, through her attorney, 
Verden E. Bettilyon, apparently conceded that there 
was grounds for a divorce, and that the divorce could 
be awarded to the respondent. The only issue to be 
contested was the distribution of the property and 
the determination of support and alimony payments, 
if any. Upon the judgment of the Court awarding 
no periodic alimony payments, the appellant appar-
ently then decided to contest the grounds of the di-
vorce, which objection was renewed against the sec-
ond judgment. 
There is little question as to the status of the 
law upon this point. In many cases in the past this 
Court has made it clear that when a marriage is 
obviously deteriorated to the point that it would be 
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folly to do otherwise than to dissolve it, the trial 
court should grant the divorce. Obviously, no defin-
ite standard can be set up as to what must be shown 
in order to establish grounds for a divorce. The re-
spondent concedes that a divorce must be based on 
more than merely the desire of the parties to be 
separated inasmuch as the public has an interest in 
whether there exists sufficient ground for the dis-
solution of the marriage. However, the Court has 
made it clear that divorce cases are to be approached 
on a pragmatic basis with concern of the de-facto 
status of the marriage. 
In the present case the respondent alleged that 
the appellant had treated him cruelly, causing him 
great mental distress. It is the position of the re· 
spondent that the evidence is clearly sufficient to 
establish that the appellant has in fact caused the ' 
respondent great mental distress by their constant 1 
arguing and her frequent deprecation of him ( 66 
TR 8, 9, 10). The testimony also clearly shows 
that the marriage had disintegrated to the point 
that it was folly to think that it could be reconsti-
tuted. ( 66 TR 35). The uncontroverted evidence 
establishes that the parties quarreled continuously 
when the respondent was not on the road and was 
at home. ( 66 TR 12). There was some variation as 
to the cause of these arguments; however, it was 
agreed that many of them stemmed from disagree-
ment over financial matters, in particular the pro-
pensities of the appellant to spend more money than 
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was needed, and her apparent lack of appreciation 
for the sacrifices of the respondent while on the 
road. He testified that they were constantly in debt 
and that his wife never seemed to get the bills paid, 
even though she would get his pay check plus part 
of the per diem with which to pay them. ( 66 TR 7) . 
The appellant's answer was always that she was 
only spending that which was necessary; however, 
he1· concept of what was necessary obviously did not 
agree with that of the respondent. He testified that 
this constant fighting over finances and his ability 
as a breadwinner was a source of great emotional 
frustration to him and that when the matter was 
discussed with the appellant her attitude was merely 
that she couldn't get along on less. ( 66 TR 7) . The 
respondent also testified that his wife was constant-
ly inciting him to wrath by digging and cutting re-
marks directed towards him in public and in private 
( 66 TR 8), which, accompanied by the berating 
he received from his colleagues while trying to 
live frugally on the road, was a source of great 
mental distress to him ( 66 TR 11) . He also 
states that on one occasion his wife had gone 
through his luggage without his permission and had 
found some shorts which he had packed to wear at 
a physical examination in place of the LDS gar-
ments which he normally wore and that she had 
confronted him with these shorts and had inferred 
that he was involved in an illicit affair while on the 
road. ( 66 TR 9-10). He also testified that the appel-
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lant besides possessing a domineering personality 
was a sloppy housekeeper, that she often was yelling 
and screaming at the children ( 66 TR 34), that she 
argued and berated the respondent in front of the 
children ( 66 TR 12), and that she would sleep a 
good part of the day and that it was common prac-
tice for him to get up in the morning and take care 
of the children and get them fed and off to school 
( 66 TR 34). As a result of these arguments with 
the appellant and the berating which she heaped 
upon him, the respondent testified that he did not 
want to spend another minute with her (66 TR 10) 
and that he couldn't get away from the house fast 
enough ( 66 TR 35) . 
The appellant herself testified that there was 
serious and continuous quarreling between she and 
the respondent ( 66 TR 45). She stated that the 1 
arguments were serious in nature ( 66 TR 45) and , 
that in her opinion the arguments were sufficient 
to cause a breakup of an average marriage. ( 66 TR 
46). She also stated that if she had her way, she 
would have all of the respondent's pay check instead 
of just part of its as support. (66 TR 48). 
It appears obvious that there is sufficient basis 
for the trial Court's finding that the respondent had 
suffered mental cruelty as a result of his wife's ac-
tions and that he accordingly was granted a divorce. 
It should be noted that in neither trial did the ap-
pellant attempt to establish that the divorce should 
be awarded to her and not to the respondent. It 
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would appear that the appellant is not in a position 
to argue that the divorce should be granted to her 
and that the only question therefore is whether the 
facts establish a basis for awarding the appellant a 
divorce. A similar situation was presented in the 
case of Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 182, 278 
Pac. 2d 983 ( 1955), where the wife was questioning 
the court's decree granting the husband the divorce. 
The evidence there showed that there was constant 
fighting between the parties and that the defendant 
was of a quarrelsome disposition, that she nagged 
him and falsely accused him of laying around, rath-
er than getting up and getting a job immediately 
upon his discharge from the Army, that she was 
without cause unreasonably suspicious of his con-
duct, that she searched his pockets and when she 
discovered a telephone number in his pockets she 
would call and berate whoever answered the phone, 
that she embarrassed him by open criticism of his 
friends in their presence, and that she was generally 
disagreeable and quarrelsome and critical of him 
and he found it so intolerable that he wanted to 
escape therefrom by re-enlisting in the Army. The 
court there affirmed the divorce in behalf of the 
husband. 
On point also is the case of Curry vs. Curry, 7 
Utah 2d 198, 321 Pac. 2d 939 (1958), where the 
court laid down the following general test as to the 
grounds of mental cruelty: 
"There, of course, must be some objective 
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standards upon which to judge whether men-
tal cruelty is made out. But it must also be 
realized that what constitutes cruelty to the 
extent of causing great mental distress has 
considerable subjective content because it de-
pends somewhat upon the sensibilities of the 
person complaining and also in a measure 
upon the justification, or lack of it, for the 
conduct complained of." (Page 201) 
In the present case the record shows that the 
appellant was guilty of those actions which are com-
monly the basis of a finding of mental cruelty in 
that she berated and belittled her husband in front 
of the children and in public, that she was suspicious 
of him and his actions when he was away from home 
and would search his belongings in that regard ( 66 
TR 9-10), that she did not cooperate with him in 
financial matters which were a constant and contin- 1 
uous source of quarrel and argument between the 1 
parties, and that she left much to be desired in the 
manner in which she kept up the house and provided 
for her husband and children ( 66 TR 34) . The re-
cord also clearly shows the existence of the subjec- 1 
tive frustration and punishment that respondent in-
curred as a result of the appellant's actions and that 
in fact he suffered great mental pain and distress 
because of such actions ( 66 TR 7, 10, 34). 
No doubt, this action is similar to all divorce 
actions in the sense that the respondent has some 
responsibility for the deterioration of the marriage; 
however, the question is whether or not the record 
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indicates sufficient basis for the Court to find a di-
vorce in his favor. It appears clear that the decision 
of the Court was well within the wide latitude of 
discretion given to the Court in such matters and 
that its judgment after having observed the de-
meanor of the witnesses through two trials should 
not be changed or altered by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT 
AWARDING THE APPELLANT ANY PERI-
ODIC ALIMONY AND GRANTING IN LIEU 
THEREOF THE AMOUNT OF $2,400 PLUS 
THE HOUSE AND ALL OF 'THE FURNISH-
INGS THEREIN. 
The appellant questions the actions of the trial 
court in not granting periodic alimony. The record 
shows, however, that the appellant was fairly com-
pensated considering the facts surrounding this 
marriage and the parties' financial conditions. The 
Court reviews this issue as it does Point I under the 
rule that the findings of the District Court should 
not be overruled unless the judgment of the District 
Court works a manifest inequity or injustice. White-
head vs. Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 Pac. 2d 
987. And it is also noteworthy that the right to ali-
mony is solely within the discretion of the Court 
and that it is payable to either the husband or the 
wife depending upon the circumstances. In the case 
of Martinett vs. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 Pac. 
2d 821 ( 1958) , the Court said in reference to Sec-
tion 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
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authorizes the awarding of alimony, support money, 
and distribution of property: 
"It is important to note that this statute 
makes no distinction between the spouses. It 
does not contemplate, nor should there be 
any discrimination or inequality of such 
a wards on the basis of sex. They may be made 
in favor of either spouse, and should be based 
upon the needs of the parties and the equities 
of the situation being dealt with." (Page 205) 
The respondent in this case is not unaware of , 
the needs of the appellant. However, the respondent 
agrees with the trial court that those needs were 
filled as reasonably and equitably as could be under 
the circumstances by the division ordered by the 
Court. It should first be noted that the court award-
ed the following items to the appellant: the house, 1 
which had up to $11,000 equity, all of the furnishings 
within the house, a car, which the respondent was 
to pay $125 towards, a lump sum alimony of $2,400, 
child support of $100 per child until they reach their 
majority, and in addition to this the respondent was 
ordered to pay all of the bills which were existing 
against the family at the time the action was filed, 
which amounted to approximately $1,000 and $300 
attorney's fees. This is certainly not a case where 
the husband is absconding with the fruits of the 
marriage; in fact, it becomes obvious that he has 
been left with nothing but his own ability to con-
tinue in his job and make a living for himself. It 
is of interest to note that the appellant claims that 
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she requires approximately $520 a month in which 
to take care of herself and the two children and that 
the amount did not change when the third child left 
home. Common experience indicates that this is more 
than is necessai·y for the appellant and two children 
and that with proper management less money would 
be required for the average monthly expenses. Her 
inability to manage money contributed to the break 
up of the marriage and now is being asserted by ap-
pellant as reason for more money from the respon-
dent. The intentions of the appellant are possibly 
revealed in he1· statement on page 49 of the 66 
Transcript where in response to the question of 
whether or not she realized that the average family 
income was not $500 a month, she replied, "Well, 
Chris isn't making what an average man makes." 
Obviously, the truth is in this case that the appel-
lant could get along on less money but that she 
wants as big a cut out of the respondent's pay check 
as possible. 
The Court found that the income of the respon-
dent was approximately $218.65 every two weeks, 
exclusive, of course, of the per diem and mileage 
and any overtime. The Court, however, properly ex-
cluded consideration of the per diem inasmuch as 
the purpose of the per diem as evidenced by the 
Government regulations put in evidence as plain-
tiff's Exhibit E was to provide for the dignified 
existence of the employee while away from home, 
and thus in the Government's view and properly 
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unde1· the Court's view should not be considered as 
income to the recipient. Thus, under that finding 
the respondent would be receiving approximately a 
net of $436 a month, and that as long as he was pay-
ing the support payments his income would be ap-
proximately $236, which does not meet the $267 per 
month requirement which he testified he had to get 
along on per month ( 66 TR 13). The Court express-
ed the desire that under the circumstances of this 
case he did not want to saddle the respondent with 
periodic alimony payments ( 66 TR 58). The record 
also shows that the appellant is a qualified secretary, , 
that she could get employment, and that she at the 
present time did have employment which was paying 
her on the average $163 a month for the six months ' 
prior to the second trial ( 66 TR 44). The trial 
court's attitude obviously was that the appellant 1 
was awarded sufficient property and support pay- , 
ments to take care of her minimum requirements 
and that she would have to go to work in order to 
maintain herself at a reasonable standard. It surely 
is not an abuse of discretion for the Court to expect ' 
the appellant to go to work where her past indicates 1 
a history of employment and where she is capable of 
perf arming such work. The Court was liberal in the 
property settlement and in the support award, and 
did, in fact, award alimony to the appellant. One 
would get the impression from her position on ap-
peal that alimony was completely forgotten. It can 
hardly be said that the trial Court was unreasonable 
16 
in lieu of periodic alimony granted appellant the 
home and the amount of $2,400, which could be paid 
in a lump payment or at $100 per month which thus 
would provide $100 per month alimony for a period 
of two years. The appellant argues that the award 
must be such that there will be a guarantee that the 
appellant will not at some future time go onto the 
welfare rolls of the county. This is a facetious argu-
ment, for although it is a consideration that the 
Court must make, it cannot go so far into the future 
as to guarantee the financial security of the parties 
involved in a divorce. Under the award granted by 
the Court, there is no reason why the appellant 
should ever be on the welfare rolls. It is not the role 
of the Court to be a soothsayer, but rather to make an 
equitable settlement determining at the time of de-
cision the present and predictable future needs of 
the parties tempered by the circumstances of the 
case and the finances available. 
The respondent respectfully submits that the 
Court awarded approximately $20,000 to the appel-
lant in property and lump sum alimony, and in ad-
dition to that, awarded support payments for the 
children which will last for at least five or six years 
to come until the youngest child has reached his 
majority. The respondent has cleared all of the fam-
ily debts except those on the house and furnishings 
and has obviously left the appellant in as good a 
position as could be provided under the economic sit-
uation of these parties. A statement of the Court at 
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the conclusion of the trial was supported by the find, 
ings of fact and is therefore set out below in order 
to further inform the Court of the basis of the trial 
court's thinking and subsequent decision: 
"This defendant has demonstrated to this 
Court, from the evidence, that the plaintiff 
could not satisfy her financial needs, and I 
do!1't believe she'd be satisfied with anything 
t~1s C~urt could provide for her, with plain-
tiff bemg the source of those needs. I think 
she spoke somewhat facetiously, but some-
what correctly, when nothing short of all 
could really satisfy her ( 66 TR 56) ." 
The Court then continued on to say: 
"The Court is impressed with Mr. Gar-
rett's argument that there must be a cut off 
between these parties on this financial pay-
ment. The Court attempted to meet that by 
its former rulings; and found previously that 
the award of all the property, and the liberal 
support award was made to the plaintiff, or 
to the defendant, in lieu of any alimony. Fur-
thermore, that the plaintiff was burdened 
with a large sum of obligations, of outstand-
ing debts and obligations, incurred during the 
marriage which he has now paid. He has met 
this responsibility, and I don't think he should 
be penalized for it. vVell, this Court is not go- ) 
ing to saddle this plaintiff, under the facts ~f 
this case with a permanent award for ali-
mony. Again I point out that the Court has 
been very liberal in the property settlement 
award, giving it all to the defendant, and has 
granted a very liberal support money award. 
It was foreseeable that defendant would have 
a period of time with her son Robert living at 
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home, that she would be receiving $100 a 
month fo1· him to apply on the household ex-
penses. In light of the testimony, and the 
needs of the defendant, the Court will award 
defendant a lump sum alimony in the sum of 
$2,400. That will be payable either in cash or 
at the rate of $100 a month, whichever best 
suits the defendant, or the plaintiff's ability 
to pay; there being no interest if it is a month-
ly payment, or no discount if it is a cash pay-
ment. ( 66 TR 58-59) ." 
CONCLUSION 
This divorce action was instituted by the re-
spondent after a period of separation. Appellant 
did not want the divorce. Even though at the pre-
trial of this case it was determined that she would 
put on evidence in support of her counterclaim, she 
refused to do so at the time of trial and offered no 
evidence as to grounds for divorce on the second 
ti'ial of the action. She was content to have respon-
dent's entire pay check and a substantial portion of 
the per diem permitted him as a Government em-
ployee. All she has ever wanted from respondent is 
money, and she was content that he be away from 
home a major portion of the time. The foundation 
of her appeal in this case is financial. She wants 
nominal alimony. This may appear to be innocuous, 
but her real motive is to continue her financial 
slranglehold on respondent. Were the Court to grant 
the relief she asks, it would only be a matter of a 
short time before the Court would be asked to in-
19 
crease the award, and this would become an endless-
ly litigated matter. 
Affirmatively, the record shows that the appel-
lant received all of the property the parties had 
accumulated during their marriage; received a gen-
erous amount for child support and a lump sum of 
$2,400 in lieu of alimony. The Decree of Divorce in 
favor of respondent was supported by sufficient 
evidence, and clearly the trial court did not abuse 
discretion in the property settlement. 
The Decree in the lower court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 





Edward M. Garrett 
W. Brent Wilcox 
